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Abstract The revolution in semantics in the late 1960s and 1970s overturned an earlier
competingparadigm, ‘translational’ semantics. I revive anddefendPrior’s translational
semantics formodals and tense-modals. I also showhow to extendPrior’s propositional
modal semantics to quantificational modal logic, and use the resulting semantics to
formalize Prior’s own counterexample to the Barcan Formula.
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1 Introduction: the translational paradigm
Translational semantics is a nowadays neglected form of semantics that pre-dates the
meteoric rise of Tarski-style truth-conditional semantics in the 1960s and 1970s. In
translational semantics, the key semantical predicate is translates as, or some cognate
term, rather than is true (in or at). Translational semantics for both extensional and
intensional languages give accounts of the meanings of the sentences of the target
language, by virtue of specifying translations of these sentences into a semantically
more perspicuous language, such as an enriched predicate calculus.
A translational semantics will typically not involve semantic ascent, and will not
offer the modern-day semantic staples of satisfaction clauses, valuations that supply
formal truth-conditions, set-theoretic constructs constituting the semantic values of
sub-sentential terms of the object-language, and so forth. A translational semantics
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may be formal, recursive, and completely rigorous. Translational semantics is, how-
ever, virtually unknown today. Max Cresswell, in his contribution to this volume,
effectively sums up the modern attitude when he says: ‘Semantics … is not the same
as translating an object language into another object language’.1
Translational semantics was supplanted by the new truth-conditional paradigm dur-
ing a heady revolution that began in the late 1960s, and reached full force during the
1970s. Some of the precipitating events were the publication of Donald Davidson’s
paper ‘Truth and Meaning’ in 1967, Saul Kripke’s succession of papers on modal
semantics, beginning in 1959 and continuing throughout the 1960s, and the work of
JaakkoHintikka, DavidKaplan, RichardMontague, Dana Scott, and others. In his now
classic 1967 paper, Davidson urged that Tarski’s recursive theory of truth be regarded
as a theory of meaning, arguing that ‘a theory of meaning for a language L shows
“how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meanings of words” if it contains
a (recursive) definition of truth-in-L’.2 He added polemically: ‘And, so far at least,
we have no other idea how to turn the trick’. In fact, as I shall explain, translational
semantics is and was perfectly capable of showing how the meanings of sentences
depend on the meanings of their components.
An influential manifesto of the new paradigm in semantics was the 1976 collection
Truth and Meaning, edited by two young storm troopers of the revolution, Gareth
Evans and John MacDowell. Their introduction to this volume contained a spirited
attack on the older rival paradigm. They said, ‘We call this view, according to which
the job of a theory of meaning is to provide rules relating sentences to their semantic
representations, “translational semantics”’.3 They intended to leave their readers in
no doubt that translational semantics was utterly bankrupt, freely using words like
‘wrong’, ‘objectionable’, and ‘utter incapacity’, in order to express their contempt for
the outgoing paradigm. Although rousing in those revolutionary days, their arguments
have not withstood the test of time. For example, they exhorted ‘What we ought to be
doing is stating what sentences of the language mean, stating something such that, if
someone knew it, he would be able to speak and understand the language’.4 However,
that is exactly what translational semantics does do.
Their key objection, which they said ‘devastates translational semantics’, is that
‘someone could know it [the semantics] without understanding the language of which
it is theory’.5 Yet exactly the same is true of truth-conditional semantics. Someone
could know, for example, that v(LA, i) = T if and only if ∀ j ( j ≤ i → v(A, j) = T)
without thereby understanding what the object language statement LA means. For
a truth-conditional semantics to succeed in assigning meanings to the statements of
the object language, the meta-language must not consist of mere formalism but must
be interpreted (e.g., in terms of possible worlds, accessibility, and truth at a world),
and moreover must be understood as such by the person for whom the theory is
1 Cresswell (2015, p. 1–17).
2 Davidson (1967, p. 310).
3 Evans and MacDowell (1976, p. ix).
4 Evans and MacDowell (1976, p. ix).
5 Evans and MacDowell (1976, p. x).
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to serve as a theory of meaning for the object language.6 Likewise with translational
semantics: for the theory to serve as a theory of meaning, the semantically perspicuous
language in which meaning-giving translations are formulated must—of course—be
understood by the person for whom the theory is to serve as a theory of meaning; and
if someone does understand the semantically perspicuous language, and does know
the rules relating target sentences to their translations, then they will ipso facto also
understand the statements of the target language.
Because Davidsonian truth theories are extensional, extensionally equivalent
expressions can be substituted into the theory without changing the truth-values of the
relevant T-sentences. Evans andMacDowell called the result of performing extension-
ally equivalent but intentionally inequivalent substitutions a ‘mutilated’ truth theory. A
favourite example was a mutilated truth theory producing the true T-sentence “‘Snow
is white” is true if and only if grass is green’, together with indefinitely many other
true but mutilated T-sentences. Evans and MacDowell were much exercised by the
phenomenon of mutilated truth theories, concluding that these posed a severe chal-
lenge to Davidson’s original conception of truth-theoretic semantics (here they were
strongly influenced by arguments put forward by John Foster and Brian Loar).7 The
problem, of course, is that since the mutilated truth theory does not constitute a theory
of meaning for the language, how are mutilated truth theories to be excluded from the
class of genuinely meaning-giving truth theories? This was the answer that Evans and
MacDowell gave in 1976: ‘the conditions must ensure that the sentences used on the
right translate those mentioned on the left’.8 They pleaded against concluding ‘that
we have now come full circle’; and they were right, in that their semantics remained
truth-conditional rather than translational.9 But one could be excused for wondering
whether (despite their tendentious arguments) the truth-conditional curlicues of their
theory—as in ‘The German sentence “Schnee ist Weiss” is true if and only if snow
is white’—could not be dispensed with in favour of a recursive, purely translational
semantics.
Another of the semantical revolutionaries was David Lewis, who coined the mantra
Semantics with no treatment of truth conditions is not semantics.10 In two well-known
paragraphs of his 1970 article ‘General Semantics’, Lewis attacked a then-popular
form of translational semantics, namely that semantic interpretation consists of the
systematic translation of sentences of the target language into an artificial language
that Lewis dubbed SemanticMarkerese. He urged that ‘Translation intoMarkerese is at
best a substitute for real semantics’.11 He mocked: ‘Translation into Latin might serve
as well, except insofar as the designers of Markerese may choose to build into it useful
features [such as] freedom from ambiguity [and] grammar based on symbolic logic’.12
6 Copeland (1979, 1986).
7 Evans and MacDowell (1976, pp. xiii–xiv). Foster, J. A. ‘Meaning and truth theory’, and Loar, B. ‘Two
theories of meaning’, both in Evans and MacDowell (1976).
8 Evans and MacDowell (1976, pp. xiv–xv); my emphasis.
9 Evans and MacDowell (1976, p. xv).
10 Lewis (1970, p. 18).
11 Lewis (1970, p. 18).
12 Lewis (1970, p. 19).
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These are, however, crucial differences. The translational semanticist certainly does
not think that translation into any old language—Latin, English, Polish—is a way to
do semantics. The selected language must have features that make it properly suitable
for the job, and a regimented and logically transparent language based on the predicate
calculus is a much more promising candidate than Latin.
Mockery aside, Lewis gave two arguments against translational semantics. The
first was essentially the same as the point later emphasized by Evans and MacDowell:
‘But we can know the Markerese translation of an English sentence’, Lewis wrote,
‘without knowing the first thing about themeaning of the English sentence: namely, the
conditions under which it would be true’.13 However, what Lewis says here is simply
untrue. In so far as the assertions p and It is true that p give the same information, the
speaker who knows the English sentence’s translation p into the semantical language,
and understands the semantical language, does thereby know the canonical conditions
under which the English sentence is true.
Lewis’s second argument was that, because the ‘Markerese method … deals with
nothing but symbols’, this ‘prevents Markerese semantics from dealing with the rela-
tions between symbols and theworld of non-symbols—that is,with genuinely semantic
relations’.14 However, the translationalist’s semantical language brings its own appara-
tus of real-world reference, predication, quantification, and ontological commitment,
and this apparatus is in gear and working when the translation-sentences are spoken or
written by the understanding speaker. For example, a sentence of the translationalist’s
semantical language of the form ‘a bears R to b’ is no less about the objects a and b
and the relation R than is the statement that would appear on the right hand side of
a truth-conditional semantics, such as ‘The ordered pair consisting of the denotation
of term ‘a’ followed by the denotation of term ‘b’ is a member of the extension of
the relation R’. When the understanding speaker knows that the translation of S is P ,
then they ipso facto have knowledge of the relationship between the string of symbols
S and the world of non-symbols.
In his 1975 book The Language of Thought, Jerry Fodor came roaring to the defence
of translational semantics, saying that ‘translational theories’ have ‘recently become
the object of considerable philosophical disapprobation, much of it, I think, quite
undeserved’.15 He responded to Lewis’s influential critique, saying ‘It seems pertinent
… to comment on a certain unfairness that attaches to Lewis’ remarks if they are taken
as a general criticism of translational approaches to semantics’, continuing:
It is … true that ‘we can know the Markerese translation of an English sentence
without knowing the first thing about the meaning of the English sentence.’ …
But, of course, this will hold for absolutely any semantic theory whatever so long
as it is formulated in a symbolic system; and, of course, there is no alternative to
so formulating one’s theories. We’re all in Sweeney’s boat; we’ve all gotta use
words whenwe talk. Since words are not, as it were, self-illuminating like globes
on a Christmas tree, there is no way in which a semantic theory can guarantee
13 Lewis (1970, p. 18).
14 Lewis (1970, p. 19).
15 Fodor (1975, p. 119).
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that a given individual will find its formulae intelligible. So, the sense in which
we can ‘know theMarkerese translation of an English sentence without knowing
… the conditions under which it would be true’ is pretty uninteresting.16
Of course, it was not only philosophical arguments that led to the demise of the
translational paradigm. The sheer power and elegance of truth-conditional semantics
resulted in its widespread use by logicians and mathematicians. Mathematician Frank
Drake, who did work in modal logic using translational semantics before Kripke’s
model-theoretic approach to the semantics of modal logic became the default, said:
I certainly regarded Kripke’s later work as superseding mine, and even more so
the work of Dana Scott which I learned of in about 1965. I can remember being
glad to have my PhD in my pocket when I saw that work.17
Yet once translational semantics is absolved from the accusations of the revolu-
tionaries, might there not be a role for it in modern logic? Translational semantics is
leaner than its truth-theoretic brother. It carries no commitment to set theory, avoids
semantic ascent, does not assign abstract semantic values to subsentential elements
of the language, nor indeed to the sentences themselves, and approaches closer to
the homophonic ideal of giving the semantics of a language without exceeding the
resources of that very language.
2 Prior and translational semantics
Arthur Prior gave translational semantics for both tensed languages and alethic modal
languages. In the case of tensed languages, an early example of his translational seman-
tics appeared in his 1954 presidential address18 to a conference in Wellington, New
Zealand, later published as ‘The Syntax of Time-Distinctions’; and in the case of
alethic modal languages, a mature example of his translational approach appeared in
his 1962 paper ‘Possible Worlds’.19
Prior never believed that the semantical languages in which he couched his trans-
lations were, as he put it, ‘metaphysically fundamental’, and in ‘The Syntax of
Time-Distinctions’ he issued a warning against regarding his translations as ‘a meta-
physical explanation’ of the tenses.20 Elsewhere, Prior gave the same warning in the
case of alethic modal logic, saying:
Some writers have attempted to represent modal logic … as a kind of dis-
guised quantification theory—perhaps with quantification over ‘possible states
of affairs’. I don’t myself think that this will do … though I won’t develop my
objections to it now.21
16 Fodor (1975, pp. 120–121).
17 Letter from Drake to Copeland (2000); Drake (1962).
18 See Copeland (1996).
19 Prior (1958, 1962a).
20 Prior (1958, p. 115).
21 Prior (1976, p. 128).
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He said this in his article ‘What Is Logic?’, in 1962, the same year that he published
his own translational semantics for modal logic, itself couched in terms of quantifica-
tion over possible worlds (a semantics that he developed with the Irish logician Carew
Meredith). Prior should not be understood, in the above quotation, as having some
objection to possible worlds semantics per se; his point was, again, the metaphysical
one that the language of possible worlds, no less than a language involving quantifica-
tion over times, is ultimately to be explained in terms of a language with modal opera-
tors (or, in the case of time, tense operators). This was a theme to which he returned in
his final book Worlds, Times and Selves. However, despite his metaphysical orienta-
tion on thesematters, he considered the translational approach involving quantification
over worlds and times illuminating enough to make frequent use of these semantics.
Prior died in 1969, never witnessing the full force of the revolution against trans-
lational semantics. How, or whether, he would have contributed to the debate we
shall never know, although his 1957 review of Tarski’s Logic, Semantics and Meta-
mathematics certainly contains ammunition that could have been used against the
revolutionaries. For example, Prior said ‘One objection which may be made against
Tarski … is that far too much is said in this context about “sentences”’.22 Prior dis-
liked semantic ascent and was much more interested in propositions than sentences.
He preferred to reformulate Tarski’s T-sentence
The English sentence ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.
His reformulation was the propositionalised, non-metalinguistic
Whoever says that snow is white says so truly if and only if snow is white.23
In his review of Tarski, Prior dwelt on what he called a ‘defect’ in Tarski’s truth
theory, namely that the various different truth clauses (one for negation, one for dis-
junction, one for the universal quantifier, and so on) produce a ‘piecemeal definition of
truth… and the more complex the language considered the more pieces there will be’.
The result is that “‘true” has different meanings when applied to sentences of different
sorts’.24 Perhaps Prior would have wielded this same point against the Davidsonian
conception of Tarskian semantics: the semantics requires as many different concepts
of truth as there are recursive clauses in the semantics.
To make the notion of translational semantics concrete, the next section gives some
details of Prior’s semantics for the languages of modal and tense logic.
3 Prior’s tense-modal and modal semantics
In ‘The Syntax of Time-Distinctions’, Prior explained that his new PF-calculus is—
as he put it—‘interpretable within’ what he called the l-calculus, where l is read ‘is
later than’, and ‘interpretable within’ evidently means for Prior that formulae of the
PF-calculus can be translated systematically into the l-calculus. Where z is a variable
22 Prior (1957b, p. 406).
23 Prior (1961, p. 28).
24 Prior (1957b, pp. 408–409).
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representing ‘the date at which the proposition under consideration is uttered’, Prior’s
semantics for his tense operators P, F, G, and H, is as follows:
‘Fq’ (‘It will be the case that q’) is interpreted as ‘∃x(lxz &qx)’.
‘Pq’ (‘It has been the case that q’) is interpreted as ‘∃x(lzx &qx)’.
‘Gq’ (‘It will always be the case that q’) is interpreted as ‘∀x(lxz → qx)’.
‘Hq’ (‘It has always been the case that q’) is interpreted as ‘∀x(lzx → qx)’.25
For anyone who understands Prior’s augmented predicate calculus, his translational
clauses offer an explanation of the meanings of ‘Fq’, ‘Pq’, ‘Gq’, and ‘Hq’. Moreover,
the semantics arguably shows how the meanings of complex sentences arise from the
meanings of their parts, as Davidson required of a theory of meaning. ‘GPq’ (Prior’s
example) is effectively translated in two simultaneous steps, the first addressing the
meaning of the contained ‘G’ and the second addressing the meaning of the contained
‘P’, viz
‘GPq’ ⇒ ‘∀x(lxz → Pqx)’ ⇒ ‘∀x(lxz → ∃y(lxy &qy))’.
Prior’s translational modal semantics is formally very similar to his tense-modal
semantics. The variables refer to worlds instead of times or dates, and an accessibility
relation between worlds replaces the l-relation. In a section entitled ‘The Logic of
World-Accessibility’ in a 1962 article, Prior wrote:
Suppose we have the usual variables p, q, r, etc., for statements, and a, b, c, etc.,
for names of ‘worlds’ or total states of affairs. Let us then write pa for ‘It is the
case in world a that p’. ... Let us ... interpret (Lp)a, ‘Necessarily-p in world a’,
as short for ... ‘p is true in a and in all worlds accessible from it’.26
Prior provided what he called an ‘interpretation’ of modal statements by translat-
ing them systematically into his extended predicate calculus. This is Prior’s possible
worlds semantics, developed independently of Kripke.27 His notation ‘pa’ is read as ‘It
is the case in world a that p’, which, as in the above quotation, he sometimes glosses as
‘p is true in a’. Just as in the tensed case, Prior’s various translation-clauses give mean-
ings to the modal sentences under consideration; and, again, his semantics shows how
the meanings of complex sentences, such as the S4 and S5 axioms, arise recursively
from the meanings of their parts. Prior said that by reference to this interpretation of
modal statements, ‘many features of the logic of necessity and possibility are readily
explained’.
The semantics first appeared in Prior’s 1956 typescript ‘Interpretations of Different
Modal Logics in the “Property Calculus”’, which I found in the archives of the Uni-
versity of Canterbury (see Fig. 1).28 This short typescript, which Prior circulated in
mimeograph form, anticipates key elements of modern possible worlds semantics for
propositional T, S4 and S5, years before Kripke’s first publications appeared. To the
25 Prior (1958, pp. 112–113).
26 Prior (1962b, p. 140).
27 See Copeland (2002).
28 Meredith and Prior (1956).
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Fig. 1 Photograph of Prior’s 1956 typescript. With thanks to the University of Canterbury’s Library and
Photographic Unit
modern eye it all looks very familiar, but also strange—no valuations assigning truth
values, no metalanguage, no set-theoretic constructs offered as the semantic values of
expressions of the object language.
The typescript carries the attribution ‘C.A.M., August 1956; recorded and expanded
A.N.P.’. It seems that what Prior ‘expanded’ was a brief note in Meredith’s hand. I
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found this note amongPrior’s papers in theBodleianLibrary,Oxford. It consists simply
of eight lines of symbols—classic Meredith, who loved to compress his writing to the
barest minimum. In the note, Meredith set down the reflexivity and transitivity axioms
for ‘U’, the clauses for negation and implication, and the definition of L. He listed
K, T and S4 as theses, and he marked S5 with the reversed assertion sign used by
Lukasiewicz to represent rejection.
The calculus set out in the 1956 typescript is purely formal and no philosophical
interpretation is offered, either of the U-relation or of the nature of the objects to which
the variables of the calculus refer. Once the formalism has been suitably explained, the
Meredith-Prior semantics is a paradigm example of translational semantics. Meredith
was in fact expounding a sophisticated theory of possible worlds in 1956 and ear-
lier.29 But it seems that in 1956 neither he nor Prior had any interpretation to offer of
the binary relation U. It was Geach who coincidentally suggested an interpretation,
writing a letter to Prior in 1960 about ‘jumping’ between possible worlds.30 Prior
seized on Geach’s idea and took to describing U as a relation of accessibility between
worlds.
4 The Smiley barrier
As early as 1955, Timothy Smiley, at Cambridge, was pursuing an approach to modal
semantics that he later referred to as translational semantics.31 Smiley’s translational
semantics has some of the same flavour as Prior’s; Smiley’s semantical predicate, link-
ing sentences with their translations, is written ‘may be read as’, while (as mentioned
previously) Prior used ‘[is] short for’ in his 1962 article concerningworld-accessibility.
Smiley appears to be the first person to have announced completeness proofs
for the modal systems T, S4 and S5 relative to a semantics—a translational
semantics—explicitly interpreted in terms of possible worlds; this was in 1957.32
The following is an extract from a 1957 lecture handout by Smiley setting out his
semantics:
The operations ( )i are interpreted as translations of the descriptive or non-logical
terms involved in the proposition, including an identity transformation A0 = A.
Then in all of S, S4, S5, 1A may be read as (i)Ai and –1–A as (Ei)Ai: that is,
necessary truths are true in all ‘possible worlds’, and a proposition is possible if
it is true in some ‘possible world’. Choice between the three systems, or others,
would be made on acceptance of the stipulations governing the translations ( )i
—e.g. whether ‘possible worlds’ are to be arranged in a hierarchy of degrees of
remoteness from the actual world or not.33
29 Copeland (2006).
30 Geach’s letter is reproduced in Copeland (2002, p. 119).
31 Letter from Smiley to Copeland (2000).
32 Copeland (2002, pp. 120–121).
33 Smiley (1957).
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Smiley later wrote regretfully:
It is a pity that [translational semantics] turns out to be awrong turning outside the
realm of propositional logic. ... Translational semantics is incapable of dealing
with variations in the size of the domain.34
This is the ‘Smiley barrier’, the idea that translational semantics cannot be extended
to quantificational logic in such a way that the domain of the quantifiers varies from
possible world to possible world. However, Prior’s type of translational semantics can
in fact readily be extended to handle quantifiers and variable domains. The Smiley
barrier is no real obstacle to translational semantics.
5 The Barcan formula
Ruth Barcan Marcus employed a notational variant of the formula (BF1), below, in
her 1946 axiomatization of quantified modal logic.35 Instead of the notation used by
Barcan, I shall continue to use Prior’s L and M in order to express necessity and
possibility. ⥽ expresses C. I. Lewis’s strict conditional.
(BF1) M∃xFx ⥽ ∃xMFx .
(BF1) entails the material conditional:
(BF2) M∃xFx → ∃xMFx .
Both (BF1) and (BF2) are known in the literature as the ‘Barcan formula’. Here the
focus will be on (BF2); my remarks apply mutatis mutandis to (BF1).
Prior highlighted a previously unnoticed difficulty with the Barcan formula.36 He
used tenses to illustrate the problem, reading ‘Mp’ as ‘It either is or has been or will be
the case that p’, and introducing a well-chosen illustration of quantifications involving
varying domains: ‘If it either is or has been or will be the case that someone is flying
to the moon, then there is someone who either is flying or has flown or will fly to the
moon’. Regarding this statement, Prior famously said:
And it is not easy to be quite happy about this. For suppose that in fact someone
will fly to the moon some day, but not anyone who now exists. Then it will be
true that it either is, has been, or will be the case that someone is flying to the
moon; but it will not be true that there is someone who either is flying or has
flown or will fly to the moon.37
Re-expressing this idea without equating Mp to p ∨ Pp ∨ Fp, Prior’s point is simply
this: one cannot in general infer that there exists someone who will possibly reach the
moon from the proposition that possibly someone will reach the moon.
34 Letter from Smiley to Copeland (2000).
35 Marcus (1946).
36 Chap. 2 of Williamson (2013) gives an excellent history of the Barcan formula.
37 Prior (1957a, p. 26).
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The Barcan formula serves as a touchstone when developing a modal semantics in
which the domains of quantification vary. When the domain is constant, the semantics
should validate the Barcan formula; and the semantics should also validate the Barcan
formula where the domains of the two existential quantifiers are distinct but overlap
appropriately; but where the domains do not overlap, the semantics should not validate
the formula, for the reason that Prior gave.
BarcanMarcus recommended using a substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers
when giving a semantics for quantified modal logic, and I shall follow her suggestion
here.38 In the following extension of Prior’s modal semantics to quantified modal
logic, a substitution class Tw is associated with each possible world w.39 Tw contains
all atomic singular terms that denote in w, and the atomic singular terms are assumed
to denote rigidly (that is, an atomic term never has different denotations in different
worlds; although it may fail to denote anything in some worlds). Each existentially
quantified formula is translated by a sentence in which the formula, say ∃xFx , is
replaced by a substitution instance of the formula, say Ft , where t is a member of
the substitution class associated with the world in question. Since the substitution
class contains only terms that denote (in that world), quantification remains tied to
existence; and variations in the substitution classes from world to world are tied to,
and represent, variations in the domain of quantification.
The following two translational clauses (∃) and (∀) extend Prior’s semantics to
quantified modal logic. For clarity,  is used for the existential quantifier of the
semantical language, and  for the universal quantifier:
(∃) (∃xFx)w = t (t ∈ Tw & (Ft)w)
(∀) (∀xFx)w = t (t ∈ Tw → (Ft)w)
The following derivation illustrates the semantics. The derivation establishes the
Barcan formulawhen the substitution classes invoked in the two applications of (∃), Ta
and Tb, are identical. A minor variation of the derivation also establishes the formula
when Tb ⊆ Ta .
(M∃xFx)a = b(Uab& (∃xFx)b)
= b(Uab&t (t ∈ Tb & (Ft)b))
= b(Uab&t (t ∈ Ta & (Ft)b))
= t (t ∈ Ta &b(Uab& (Ft)b))
= t (t ∈ Ta & (MFt)a)
= (∃xMFx)a
Prior’s counterexample to the Barcan formula is formalized very naturally in this
semantics. Assume for simplicity that there are only two possible worlds, a and b,
38 Marcus (1962). See also Copeland (1982, 1985).
39 As in my 1982 and 1985, although the focus there was on truth-conditional semantics, not translational
semantics.
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where Uab. Again for simplicity, let us follow Saul Kripke’s suggestion that it ‘is
natural to assume that an atomic predicate should be false in a world of all those indi-
viduals not existing in that world’.40 The counterexample can, however, equally well
be formalized in a version of the semantics that deems atomic sentences truthvalueless
in worlds in which a contained atomic singular term fails to denote (in the spirit of
Prior’s System Q).41 Let Ta and Tb be distinct singletons, {s} and {u}, such that (Fu)b
but not (Fs)a (and not (Fs)b, as s does not denote anything at b). Since (∃xFx)b, it
follows that (M∃xFx)a; but since it is not the case that (MFs)a, neither is it the case
that (∃xMFx)a.
In conclusion, Priorean translational semantics escapes the Smiley barrier when the
quantifiers are treated substitutionally; and moreover, Prior’s translational approach
to modal and temporal semantics is far from being the lame duck that it might have
appeared to be, in the wake of the Tarskian revolution.
References
Copeland, B. J. (1979). Onwhen a semantics is not a semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, 399–413.
Copeland, B. J. (1982). A note on the Barcan formula and substitutional quantification. Logique et Analyse,
97, 83–86.
Copeland, B. J. (1985). Substitutional quantification and existence. Analysis, 45, 1–4.
Copeland, B. J. (1986). What is a semantics for classical negation? Mind, XCV, 478–490.
Copeland, B. J. (1996). Prior, Arthur. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
prior/.
Copeland, B. J. (2002). The genesis of possible worlds semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 31,
99–137.
Copeland, B. J. (2006). Meredith, Prior, and the history of possible worlds semantics. Synthese, 150, 373–
397.
Cresswell, M. J. (2015). Prior on the semantics of modal and tense logic. Synthese. doi:10.1007/
s11229-015-0949-0.
Davidson, D. (1967). Truth and meaning. Synthese, 17, 304–323.
Drake, F. R. (1962). On McKinsey’s syntactical characterizations of systems of modal logic. Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 27, 400–406.
Evans, G., & MacDowell, J. (Eds.). (1976). Truth and meaning: Essays in semantics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The language of thought. New York: Crowell.
Kripke, S. A. (1963). Semantical considerations on modal logic. Acta Filosophica Fennica, 16, 63–72.
Lewis, D. K. (1970). General semantics. Synthese, 22, 18–67.
Marcus, R. B. (1946). A functional calculus of the first order based on strict implication. Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 11, 1–16.
Marcus, R. B. (1962). Interpreting quantification. Inquiry, 5, 252–259.
Meredith, C. A., & Prior, A. N. (1956). Interpretations of different modal logics in the ‘Property Calculus’.
Mimeograph,University ofCanterbury PhilosophyDepartment. Reprinted inLogic and reality: Essays
on the legacy of Arthur Prior, by B. J. Copeland, (Ed.), 1996, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Prior, A. N. (1957a). Time and modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prior, A. N. (1957b). Critical notice of Alfred Tarski, Logic, semantics and metamathematics. Mind, 66,
401–410.
Prior, A. N. (1958). The syntax of time-distinctions. Franciscan Studies, 18, 105–120.
Prior, A. N. (1961). On a family of paradoxes. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 2, 16–32.
40 Kripke (1963, p. 66).
41 Prior (1957a, Chap. 5). See my 1982 details of the revised counterexample (although the treatment there
is model-theoretic, not translational).
123
Synthese (2016) 193:3507–3519 3519
Prior, A. N. (1962a). Possible worlds. Philosophical Quarterly, 12, 36–43.
Prior, A. N. (1962b). Tense logic and the continuity of time. Studia Logica, 13, 133–148.
Prior, A. N. (1976). What is logic? In A. N. Prior, Papers in logic and ethics. London: Duckworth.
Smiley, T. J. (1957). Modal logic. Lecture handout, Department of Philosophy, University of Cambridge.
Williamson, T. (2013). Modal logic as metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
123
